Trump, Orban, Erdogan. What happens if nationalist parties in France, Germany and the UK grow? Will NATO be paralyzed, perhaps even break up? If so, is there a Nordic Plan B? A lesson learned when Trump threatened Greenland in early January 2026.
“We are going to do something on Greenland, whether they like it or not.” “Because if we don’t do it, Russia or China will take control of Greenland, and we’re not going to have Russia or China as a neighbor.”
The Danish government, along with other NATO countries, decided to send troops to Greenland in January 2026 in response to incrrity tensions in the Arctic, partly linked to US claims by President Donald Trump.
The decision was made by Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen after consultation with Greenlandic authorities and NATO, announced via press conference on January 13. The aim was to strengthen military presence through Operation Arctic Endurance, with vanguard troops and equipment to prepare for receiving larger forces
January 13 – 20
Denmark sent vanguard troops (about 100 soldiers in Nuuk and Kangerlussuaq) on January 13-14, followed by Sweden, Norway, Germany and France. More followed on January 19-20. Armed with live ammunition and explosives to destroy runways. Not to stop Putin’s plan, as at Kiev airport in 2022. But as a tripwire to prevent annexation by NATO brother Trump, at any hour.
Instead, it was Trump who exploded, threatening affected countries with punitive tariffs. Until the male in Davos on January 21 promised not to use force or impose tariffs right now, only in negotiations for a framework on Greenland and the Arctic. A mini-war in Greenland had jeopardized NATO’s gatekeeper in the GIUK gap between Greenland – Iceland – Great Britain. Free rein for Russian submarines in the US’s weak life.
Danish tripwire
This operation took place in a situation of tense geopolitical rhetoric about Greenland’s strategic location, but without it being formally a NATO mission with decisions made in NATO institutions. In practice, it was an informal multilateral decision outside both the EU decision-making process and actual formal NATO decisions .
Denmark is a member of NATO , and Greenland is covered by NATO’s security guarantees as Danish territory. However, the decision to send these troops was not a formal NATO decision taken by the entire main body of the alliance , but a Danish initiative with voluntary contributions from other countries . Such multinational force contributions may be very close to NATO cooperation in practice, but organizationally the decision lies outside NATO’s normal approval processes.
A war between two groups within NATO is unmanageable. A formal decision within NATO is made by all member states together , normally in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) , which is the alliance’s highest decision-making body. All 32 member states must agree for a decision to be made in the North Atlantic Council. The USA, Hungary and even Malta can block decisions on military matters.
- The decision is an institutional NATO decision , not just a coordination between countries.
- The operation is being carried out under NATO’s command structure (SACEUR and others).
- The action may be explicitly linked to Article 4 or Article 5 .
- Legally and politically, it is the entire alliance that acts.
Takeoff for plan B
Can this informal effort in Greenland be seen as a B for the defense of the Nordic/Northern Europe, formalized in a multilateral decision-making structure. Possibly within the Nordic Defense Alliance. What difficulties are there in freeing oneself from NATO’s decision-making structure? An informal coordinated action between Nordic countries (or Northern Europe more broadly) shows that there is political and military capacity for action even without formal activation in the North Atlantic Council .
- The situation required rapid signaling/deterrence .
- They wanted to avoid formally activating Article 4 or 5.
- There is political unity between some countries but not necessarily the entire alliance.
- They wanted to keep the threshold during a formal NATO operation.
It can therefore be seen as a political signal of regional autonomy and a complementary security mechanism. But not as a full replacement for NATO. The stumbling block was passed in the NATO exercise Arctic Endurance and in March on the North Sea with the Cold Response maneuver.
Can this informal effort in Greenland be seen as a B for the defense of the Nordic/Northern Europe, formalized in a multilateral decision-making structure. Possibly within the Nordic Defense Alliance. What difficulties are there in freeing oneself from NATO’s decision-making structure?
EU
The EU does not have a common defence force and cannot currently decide on NATO-style military deployments. The EU’s response has mainly been political support for the independent decisions of Denmark and Greenland, not the EU itself organising or approving this force. The force in question was an informal multilateral
The force was military cooperation outside the EU framework and not a formal NATO mission in the legal sense. It was organized through national decisions in each country, with coordination between them (and close links to NATO logic and transatlantic security) but without a formal multilateral decision in NATO or EU institutions.
Nato
All Nordic countries are currently members of NATO (Sweden and Finland since 2024–2025), which means that:
- The defense of the Nordic region is fundamentally integrated into NATO’s planning.
- Operational planning takes place via NATO’s command structure (SACEUR, etc.).
- Deterrence is ultimately based on Article 5.
Although the article is the cornerstone of NATO, it contains several built-in vulnerabilities that an adversary could exploit.
The biggest misconception is that Article 5 implies an automatic military response. The text reads:
“…each Party shall assist the Party or Parties attacked by (…) taking such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”
The phrase “as it deems necessary” is a compromise to protect national sovereignty (especially the right of the US Congress to declare war). A member state could technically fulfill its obligations by sending blankets, diplomatic support, or medical equipment instead of tanks. There is no objective measure of what constitutes “sufficient” support.
Article 5 is activated in the event of an “armed attack.” But what defines such a year in 2026?
- Hybrid threat: If Russia carries out a massive cyberattack that knocks out the Swedish power grid and causes deaths, is it an “armed attack”?
- Salami tactics: If a foreign power occupies a Greenlandic fjord or cuts submarine cables in the Baltic Sea – is it worth starting a third world war for?
- The problem: Adversaries operate just below the threshold of what can be unanimously classified as an armed attack, creating indecision within NATO.
The right of veto
NATO is governed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) , where all decisions are made by consensus.
- Political paralysis: If a single country (e.g. due to political infiltration, economic dependence on the aggressor, or internal populism) vetoes it, NATO as an organization cannot formally activate Article 5.
- The time factor: While 32 countries debate whether an event was an accident or an attack, an attacker may have already established control over a territory (a so-called fait accompli ).
Article 5’s main strength is its psychological deterrence . As long as an attacker believes that the US and Europe will respond with full force, it works.
The weakness is exposed when deterrence fails. This opens up the possibility of bi- and multinational agreements (JEF, Nordefco, DCA). These act as an “Article 5-light” . They do not require the approval of 32 countries and can act immediately while large NATOs are stuck in bureaucracy.
Ex-Nato?
The most important legal point is Article 8 of the NATO Treaty. While it prohibits members from entering into agreements that conflict with the treaty, it does not prevent them from entering into additional security arrangements.
NATO has never claimed to be the sole defense organization for its members. As long as Nordic cooperation aims to strengthen the region’s defense, it is considered to support NATO’s overall goal of deterrence. If a country (e.g. Hungary or Turkey) were to block a formal NATO decision, the bi- and multinational agreements would come into force. These do not require consensus within NATO to be activated.
A starting point is Nordefco, which from 2024 is a collaboration between Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Not a defense alliance but aims at coordination for exercises and purchases. But lacks a collective defense guarantee . Such a guarantee requires:
- A formal defense guarantee (Article-5-like clause) .
- A common political decision-making mechanism.
- Joint operational planning.
- Integrated management structure.
- Clarified relationship with NATO.
Such obstacles are being removed. The Nordic defense cooperation Nordefco has undergone a radical change in 2024–2025.
Joint operational planning: The Nordic countries are now planning how to defend the Arctic and the Baltic Sea as a single, coherent theatre. The rules have been simplified so that Norwegian planes can land on Swedish bases and Finnish troops can move through Norway without the bureaucratic delays that a full-scale NATO activation can entail.
These agreements serve as necessary reinforcements. In the modern security architecture of 2026, bi- and multinational cooperation is not seen as competitors to NATO, but as its “rapid reaction forces.”
Is the US DCA agreement a role model?
The bilateral DCA agreements (Defense Cooperation Agreement) that Sweden, Finland and Denmark have with the US can be seen as insurance? Or as a ticket to seize Greenland, Iceland or Svalbard.
The DCA (Defense Cooperation Agreement) is a bilateral agreement between Denmark and the United States , which regulates US access to certain military facilities. Legal status for US personnel. As well as arranging logistical and operational arrangements. It is a further development of the long-standing defense cooperation around the US presence in Greenland (formerly Thule Air Base, now Pituffik Space Base.
DCA:
- provides access and right of use,
- does not transfer territorial control ,
- does not change Greenland’s status as part of the Danish kingdom.
Annexation would require: 1) transfer by agreement. 2) or unilateral seizure of power (in violation of international law).
A unilateral annexation would violate: 1) the UN Charter’s prohibition of violence (Article 2(4)). 2) the principle of territorial integrity. 3) the principle of self-determination (Greenland has self-government).
An American annexation of another NATO country’s territory would create a serious alliance crisis, likely triggering enormous political and legal consequences, perhaps undermining the entire collective defense arrangement for NATO.
US ”Fast Track”: Through DCA, the US can send reinforcements to specific bases in the Nordic region based on a purely bilateral decision between, for example, Stockholm and Washington.
Bypasses Brussels: This means that if NATO headquarters in Brussels were paralyzed due to political deadlocks, the American military machine could still be set in motion against the Nordic countries.
/ By Ingemar Lindmark